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When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contracting parties
finally met in Punta del Este to launch the Uruguay Round of negotiations, they
agreed to devote some considerable part of their energies to improvements in the
dispute-resolution processes of the GATT. Enthusiasm for this venture differed
significantly among countries. As the Declaration itself makes clear, some coun-
tries thought that improvements in dispute resolution would not be particularly
useful unless the GATT disciplines themselves were improved. More importantly,
however, at the time, the parties were in substantial disagreement over the funda-
mental premises underlying dispute resolution in the context of multilateral trade.
Historically, some countries, particularly the members of the European Union
(EU), have preferred a more diplomatic, flexible, or equitable approach to dispute
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1. The contracting parties declared:
In order to ensure prompt and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all
contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the rules and
the procedures of the dispute settlement process, while recognizing the contribution
that would be made by more effective and enforceable GATT rules and disciplines.
Negotiations shall include the development of adequate arrangements for overseeing
and monitoring of the procedures that would facilitate compliance with adopted recom-
mendations.
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Sept. 20, 1986, 33 GATT/BISD 19, 25 (1987).
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resolution in the context of the GATT.2 These countries, highlighting the ambiguity
of GATT rules, the political sensitivity of trade disputes, and the complex trade-offs
of competing interests that go into the formulation of any trade rule have argued that
GATT dispute resolution should not be particularly formal, legal, or adjudicatory.3
Rather, it should be characterized by consultations, negotiations, and diplomatic
compromises. The goal of dispute resolution in the GATT context should not be
to create clear-cut, binding rules or rigorous applications of the law. Instead, the
process should be designed to end the dispute by ending the violation as soon as
possible. Given the sovereign nature of the disputants, this goal is best accom-
4plished through careful negotiations and appropriate compromises.
Other countries have preferred a more adjudicatory and legalistic approach to
GATT dispute resolution. The United States has usually been the leading proponent
of this view, in which the rules, and thus the expectations, will become much clearer
and more predictable if GATT dispute resolution is characterized by rule-based
decisions rendered through an adjudicatory dispute-resolution process.5 The clarity
and certainty produced by building a credible body of GATT jurisprudence will
increase compliance with GATT standards. Moreover, a rule-oriented approach
will reduce the differences in rigor of application of GATT rules that result when
countries of differing economic power and clout are left to their own devices to
work out questions of interpretation and application among themselves.
Proponents of the more adjudicatory approach also argue that more rigorous and
effective enforcement of GATT rules will help stave off protectionist pressures in
various countries. As one commentator has noted, an adjudicatory-type process
to ensure " 'reciprocity,' 'fair trade' and avoidance of real trade warfare is a
domestic political necessity for the United States executive, prescribed by Section
2. For an excellent discussion of these differences of view among countries and the way in
which these underlying philosophical differences have affected various countries' approaches to
dispute resolution within the GATT, see Miquel MontafiA i Mora, A GA7T with Teeth: Law Wins
over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103,
128-36 (1993).
3. For a particularly strong expression of that view (by someone in a particularly good position
to know the views of certain important trading countries), see R. Phan ran Phi, A European View
of the GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. LAW. 150 (1986). See also Meinhard Hilf, EC and GATT: A European
Proposal for Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures, in GATT AND CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT: A TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGY FOR A STRONGER REGIME 63 (Reinhard Rode ed.,
1990).
4. For an interesting analysis of the arguments in favor of a less legalistic approach in at least
one important area of trade, see Lisa S. Klainman, Applying GA TT Dispute Settlement Procedures
to a Trade-in-Services Agreement: Proceed with Caution, 11 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 657 (1990).
5. For an exceptionally articulate presentation of this view, see John H. Jackson, Governmental
Disputes in International Trade Relations: A Proposal in the Context of GATT, 13 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 1 (1979). See also Robert E. Hudec, GA TTDisputeSettlementafterthe Tokyo Round: An Unfinished
Business, 13 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 145 (1980); Donald E. deKieffer, GATT Dispute Settlement: A
New Beginning in International and U.S. Trade Law, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 317 (1980); E.
Petersmann, Strengthening the GA TT Dispute Settlement System: On the Use ofArbitration in GA Tr,
in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS 323 (E. Petersmann & M. Hilf eds., 1988).
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301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and politically imperative for demonstrating to
Congress the executive's active enforcement of American rights." 6 Some com-
mentators believe that a more legalistic approach to GATT dispute resolution
might even help reduce pressure within the EU for more protectionist measures
now that parties within the EU are entitled to rely on the GATT in bringing
complaints before the EU.7
The results of the Uruguay Round negotiations move the GATT significantly
in the direction of those who prefer a more adjudicatory, legalistic approach.
The agreements are not free from ambiguity, however, and the movement to
legalism is not complete. A careful historical and textual analysis of the
agreements is necessary to understand what the agreements accomplished and
what was left undone, as well as to predict how disputes will be resolved under
the new rules.8
I. A Brief History of Dispute Resolution in the GATT
A. PRE-TOKYO ROUND: PANELS AND POLITICS
The initial GATT dispute resolution provisions, articles XXI 9 and XXIII,'°
fell pretty much on the nonlegalistic side of the line. Article XXII required only
6. E. Petersmann, Strengthening GATT Procedures for Settling Disputes, 11 WORLD ECON.
55, 77 (1988).
7. See MontaMii i Mori, supra note 2, at 135.
8. For a discussion that analyzes GATT dispute-resolution provisions not in terms of the lawyer
versus the diplomat, but rather in terms of their effectiveness in advancing "public" versus "private"
interests, see Kenneth W. Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond,
28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 31 (1992); Kenneth W. Abbott, The Uruguay Round and Dispute Resolution:
Building a Private-Interests System of Justice, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 111.
9. Article XXII:
1. Each contracting party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and shall afford
adequate opportunity for consultation regarding, such representations as may be made
by another contracting party with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this
Agreement.
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may, at the request of a contracting party,
consult with any contracting party or parties in respect of any matter for which it
has not been possible to find a satisfactory solution through consultation under
paragraph 1.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, entered into force Jan. 1, 1948, 61 Stat. A5, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 [hereinafter GATT].
10. GATT art. XXIII:
1. If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it directly or
indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired or that the attainment
of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded as the result of (a) the failure of
another contracting party to carry out its obligations under this Agreement, or (b) the
application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts
with the provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other situation, the
contracting party may, with a view to the satisfactory adjustment of the matter, make
written representations or proposals to the other contracting party or parties which it
considers to be concerned. Any contracting party thus approached shall give sympa-
thetic consideration to the representations or proposals made to it.
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consultations and "sympathetic consideration" to the complaints of an allegedly
aggrieved country. If the dispute was still unresolved after bilateral consultations,
the complainant could escalate the matter, seeking consultations on a multilateral
level with the contracting parties.
Article XXIII had slightly, but only very slightly, more teeth. In cases of article
XXIII disputes, the complainant again had a right to consultations and sympathetic
consideration. If this attempt at resolution failed, the unhappy complainant could
take the matter to the contracting parties, who were then required to "promptly
investigate" and "make appropriate recommendations . . . or give a ruling on
the matter, as appropriate."'"
Article XXIII goes on to provide that appropriate measures might, if the "cir-
cumstances are serious enough," include the suspension of concessions or other
GATT obligations by the aggrieved party against the offending party. The threat of
suspension of concessions has not been particularly dire over the years, however,
having been invoked only once. 2 It would appear that the general GATT practice
of requiring that all decisions of the contracting parties be unanimous has been
a bit of a barrier to authorizing the withdrawal of concessions. Allegedly offending
countries apparently do not often find it in their interest to authorize retaliation
against themselves. Thus, even these enhanced procedures were hardly supportive
of adjudication or arbitration procedures.
Those who favored more adjudicatory-type proceedings undoubtedly antici-
pated that such a mechanism would be part of the planned Multilateral Trade
Organization (MTO) that was intended to implement, interpret, and, over time,
improve upon the basic substantive rules agreed upon in the GATT. The failure
2. If no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned
within a reasonable time, or if the difficulty is of the type described in paragraph I(c)
of this Article, the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The
CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them
and shall make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they
consider to be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate. The CON-
TRACTING PARTIES may consult with contracting parties, with the Economic and
Social Council of the United Nations and with any appropriate inter-governmental
organization in cases where they consider such consultation necessary.
If the CONTRACTING PARTIES consider that the circumstances are serious
enough to justify such action, they may authorize a contracting party or parties to
suspend the application to any other contracting party or parties of such concessions
or other obligations under this Agreement as they determine to be appropriate in the
circumstances. If the application to any contacting party of any concession or other
obligation is in fact suspended, that contracting party shall then be free, not later than
sixty days after such action is taken to give written notice to the Executive Secretary
to the CONTRACTING PARTIES of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement
and such withdrawal shall take effect upon the sixtieth day following the day on which
such notice is received.
11. GATT art. XXIII(2).
12. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 165-84
(1990).
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to enact the MTO left much of the GATT, especially its institutional aspects, in
some substantial philosophical and legal limbo. Nowhere was this lack of legal
coherence felt more acutely than in the dispute-resolution provisions. Neverthe-
less, over time and out of necessity, article XXIII became the basis for a somewhat
more formal dispute resolution process, though, for many years, not to the degree
the legalists had advocated.
13
From the beginning until 1952 the contracting parties carried out their responsi-
bilities under article XXIII by forming working parties. These working parties
consisted of representatives of the various governments and were charged with
the task of investigating and recommending an appropriate solution in line with
the principles and provisions of the GATT. The contracting parties were then
to consider and, in most cases, adopt the working parties' recommendations.
While the working parties could have evolved into arbitral tribunals, they
initially operated more as conciliatory or mediatory institutions. The parties to
the dispute were involved in all the proceedings, and the main function of the
working parties was to mediate and guide the parties to a solution acceptable to
all, rather than to impose a solution based on a considered interpretation of the
provisions of the GATT. In most cases, by the time the working parties made
a recommendation to the contracting parties, the disputants were in agreement,
and adoption by the contracting parties was almost a formality.14
In 1952, upon the suggestion of the chairman of the seventh session of the
contracting parties, the working parties were transformed into panels and became
more adjudicatory. The secretariat of the GATT began to play a stronger role
in the selection of the panelists, and the parties to the dispute were increasingly
required to offer their views more in the form of briefs than negotiating positions.
The panel reports began to resemble arbitration decisions much more than negoti-
ated compromises.15 As a result, until the late 1950s or early 1960s, those who
favored a more legalistic approach found much to be happy with. Indeed, a
number of commentators have labeled these the "golden years of the GATT," 16
13. For a comprehensive discussion of GATT dispute-resolution rules and practices over the
years, see PIERRE PESCATORE, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, HANDBOOK OF
GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1994).
14. See John H. Jackson, GATT as an Instrument for the Settlement of Trade Disputes, 61 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 144 (1967) [hereinafter Jackson, GATT as an Instrument]; JOHN H. JACKSON,
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989);
Jeffrey M. Waincymer, GA'TT Dispute Settlement: An Agenda for Evaluation and Reform, 14 N.C.
J. INT'L COM. REG. 81 (1989).
15. See Jackson, GATT as an Instrument, supra note 14, at 148 (noting the international court
"flavor" of the panels).
16. R. Gadbaw, The Outlook for GAiT as an Institution, in MANAGING TRADE RELATIONS IN
THE 1980s, at 34 (S. Rubin & T. Graham eds., 1990); see J. FAWCETr, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
CONFLICTS: PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION 82 (1977); HUDEC, supra note 12, at 95.
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at least from the perspective of a legalistic, adjudicatory-based, dispute-resolution
process. 17
As the 1960s began, the contracting parties gradually had more trouble adopting
the reports, especially those reports that would have authorized any kind of
compensatory withdrawal of concessions. Moreover, with the increased member-
ship in the GATT, the "consensus underlying basic GATT principles" started
to erode."5 Disputes also arose in areas and with respect to problems not even
vaguely anticipated by the original drafters of the GATT.1 9 Finally, at least one
major trading bloc, the European Community, began to centralize its decision
making on trade matters, a move uncontemplated by, and decisively unsettling
for, the original GATT.20 The upshot of these developments was a decline in
the use and effectiveness of the emergent GATT dispute-resolution procedures.
The 1970s saw a slight resurgence in the use of the GATT dispute-resolution
procedures. The different underlying views on dispute resolution, however, were
probably never more apparent than during this period. The number of cases
brought to panels increased, but so did the length of time necessary for their
resolution and the level of dissatisfaction with the results, or lack thereof.
B. THE TOKYO ROUND: UNDERSTANDING OF 1979
The unhappy experiences of the 1970s led to the "Understanding of 1979,"
an agreement regarding dispute resolution reached during the Tokyo Round nego-
tiations.21 The Understanding, while of uncertain legal status, basically confirmed
and refined the customary practices that had developed during the prior two
decades.
At first blush, the Understanding of 1979 appears to move slightly in the
direction of legalism. It first reaffirms the right of a party under article XXIII(2)
to refer the matter to the contracting parties.22 It mandates time limits within which
17. For discussions of how the GATT dispute settlement processes gradually evolved into some-
thing more legalistic, see Erwin P. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GATT Dispute Settlement:
Moving Towards Legalism, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 38 (1990); Robert E. Hudec, The Judicialization
of GATTDispute Settlement, in WHOSE INTEREST? DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE 9 (M. Hart & D. Steger eds., 1990).
18. MontafiA i Mora, supra note 2, at 119.
19. Id. at 121.
20. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 759 (1969); MontafiA i
Mora, supra note 2, at 120.
21. The Understanding of 1979 was formally titled the "Understanding Regarding Notification,
Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance." It contained an annex, the "Agreed Description
of the Customary Practice of the GATT in the Field of Dispute Settlement." 265 GATT/BISD 210,
215 (1980) [hereinafter Understanding of 1979].
22. The Understanding of 1979 also specifies that such referral will not be considered a contentious
act in the context of the GATT. The Understanding also gives the parties the alternative of referring
the matter to conciliation in the event consultations are unsuccessful, but this requires the consent
of all the parties to the dispute. Id. 8.
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the panel must be formed after the director general makes a recommendation to
the contracting parties.23 It formalizes the principles governing the composition
of the panel.24 It also specifies that if a matter goes to a panel, a report must
issue and that report shall be adopted by consensus within a "reasonable time."
25
Finally, such adoption also makes the report binding upon the parties.26
At the same time, however, the Understanding of 1979 contains provisions
that provide strong, and possibly definitive, support for the diplomatic approach
to dispute resolution. For example, the Understanding starts by suggesting the
practice of a little preventive medicine, urging parties to notify each other of
any steps they might take that would affect the operation of the GATT.2 7 It
then reaffirms the desirability of solving disagreements through consultations.2s
Though it suggests the consultations should proceed "expeditiously," 29 it places
no time limits on them. The description of the panel's function and the composi-
tional preference for government experts, moreover, appears to give primacy to
the panel's mediatory, not adjudicatory roles.3 ° In addition, the Understanding
does not provide any mechanism for adopting a panel report over the objection
of the offending party whose behavior is criticized in the report. It also does
little to improve the oversight, supervision, or monitoring of the implementation
of a panel's recommendations. Finally, the Understanding does not appear to
give the aggrieved parties-and perhaps not even the contracting parties-any
real powers to enforce the recommendations of a panel, even those recommenda-
tions that are finally adopted. 3' At least for the moment, the diplomats had success-
fully beaten back the lawyers.32
The diplomats' victory was not entirely satisfactory, however. Employment
23. Id. I 11.
24. Id. 14.
25. Id. 21.
26. Montafi i Mora, supra note 2, at 123.
27. Understanding of 1979, supra note 21, 3.
28. Id. 6.
29. Id. 4.
30. See Hudec, supra note 5, at 183-87; Philip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule
of Law," 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1018-19 (1985). The annex itself makes clear that "mutually
acceptable" solutions are preferable. Understanding of 1979, supra note 21, annex 4. Preferable
to what is not expressed, but the tenor of the Understanding of 1979 and annex leave little doubt
that the preference is to adjudicated or imposed solutions.
31. See Montafit i Mora, supra note 2, at 123-24.
32. The Tokyo Round also made another notable contribution to the GATT dispute-resolution
process, namely, the establishment of many separate dispute-resolution procedures in each of the
separate codes negotiated during the Tokyo Round. See John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GA7T-MTN
System: A Constitutional Appraisal, 12 LAW & POLY INT'L Bus. 21 (1980). Some applauded this
development, while others saw it as a step backwards for the development of a coherent, consistent
body of GATT law that might be useful in imposing real disciplines on the behavior of member
states. For a discussion of both views, see MontafiA i Mora, supra note 2, at 124-26. Whatever the
merits of those various views, however, it is clear that this aspect of the Tokyo Round did not
particularly contribute to the legalization of the basic GATT dispute-resolution machinery.
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of the GATT dispute-resolution machinery did increase after the Tokyo Round.33
Some cases were resolved expeditiously and effectively, especially when the
political stakes were relatively low.34 But, by most accounts, whenever the stakes
were high, the procedure was less successful than the authors had hoped.
The list of complaints was long and not wholly unfamiliar. As one author put
it: "The main problems included disputes over when the consultation phase
had been exhausted, delays in the formation of panels, disagreements over their
composition and their terms of reference, discussions as to their function,
blockages of the panel reports, and noncompliance with the recommendations." 35
The stage was set for the Uruguay Round.36
II. Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round
The ultimate result of the Uruguay Round negotiations on dispute resolution
must be judged as a decisive, though imperfect, step in the direction of a more
legalistic, adjudicatory process. The movement in that direction is far from com-
plete, at least when viewed from the perspective of common-law judicial tradition.
But, even if the pace of the change is not entirely satisfactory, the direction is
relatively clear. The legalists have gained a modest advantage over the diplo-
mats.37
The Uruguay Round changes proceeded in two steps. The first step was adop-
tion of the "Improvements of 1989." These were adopted in April 1989 and
embodied the results of the negotiations as of the time of the 1988 Mid-term
Review. 38 The second step, embodied in the 1994 "Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes," is a relatively comprehensive
33. See Robert E. Hudec, Dispute Settlement, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND: A RE-
SULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GATT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 180 (J. Schott ed., 1990); U.S.
INT'L TRADE COMM., REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TRADE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER THE
GATT AND TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS (1985).
34. See Montafi i Mora, supra note 2, at 125.
35. Id. at 127 (footnotes omitted).
36. For a comprehensive commentary on the state of pre-1988 GATT dispute settlement and
the proposals for change made at the start of the Uruguay Round, see E. Petersmann, Proposals
for Improvements in the GATT7 Dispute Settlement System: A Survey and Comparative Analysis, in
FOREIGN TRADE IN THE PRESENT AND A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 340 (D. Dicke
& E. Petersmann eds., 1988).
37. For discussions of why some of the diplomats gradually shifted to legalism, see Remarks
by Christoph Bail, former legal adviser to the European Community's permanent delegation to Geneva
from 1985-1991, in What's Needed for the GATT after the Uruguay Round, 1992 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. 71; Montafi i Mora, supra note 2, at 127-36. For a discussion of why the United States may
have lost some of its enthusiasm for legalism by the end of the Uruguay Round, see David Palmeter
& Gregory J. Spack, Resolving Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Disputes: Defining GATT's
Role in an Era of Increasing Conflict, 24 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1145 (1993).
38. Conciliation, Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, GATT/
BISD 36/61 (1990) [hereinafter Improvements of 19891.
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elaboration of the rules and procedures governing dispute resolution under the
GATT, though not a formal amendment to either article XXII or XXIII.
39
A. IMPROVEMENTS OF 1989
The Improvements of 1989 took seven important steps in the direction of a
more formal, legalistic, adjudicatory-oriented regime. First, the Improvements
required a targeted contracting party to respond to a request for consultations
within a strict and relatively short time period; they then permitted an allegedly
aggrieved country to call a halt to the consultations and request the establishment
of a panel within another fixed time period. 40
Second, the Improvements addressed the issues of good offices, conciliation,
and mediation, making various technical, but useful refinements in those proce-
dures. For example, they added specific time periods within which those activities
should take place and the basic procedures that should be followed. 41 The basic
character of these procedures did not change, but the refinements gave them a
greater air of formality and created concrete steps in a process that, in the event
the problem is not solved, leads inexorably and quite quickly to a modified and
formalized panel procedure.
Third, the Improvements addressed various aspects of the panel formation
process. They made more formal the procedures for establishing the terms of
reference42 and eliminated the preference for governmental experts.43 This latter
step, in particular, has been considered a useful move towards the legalization
of the dispute-resolution process, because it signals an intention to create panels
of independent experts who make decisions free of the biases that inevitably
attend government service.
Fourth, the Improvements apparently vested a right in third parties to intervene
in proceedings of interest. Article F(e)(2) states that "[a]ny third contracting
party having a substantial interest . . . shall have an opportunity to be heard
.. . and to make written submissions.'44 In practice, interventions were generally
allowed, but the Improvements left no doubt as to third party's standing.
Fifth, and very importantly, the Improvements addressed the problem of pro-
39. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in THE RE-
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 404, annex 2 (GATT
Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter Understanding of 1994].
40. A party must reply to a request for consultations within ten days and then commence consulta-
tions within thirty days. Improvements of 1989, supra note 38, § C. 1. The complainant may request
the establishment of a panel sixty days after first requesting consultations. Id. § C.2.
41. Id. § D.
42. Id. § F(b).
43. Id. § F(c).
44. Id. § F(e)(2). The Understanding of 1979 suggested that third parties "should" have an
opportunity to make written submissions and be heard. While a strong exhortation to admitting third
parties, the Understanding of 1979, with its use of the more wishy-washy "should," did not create
the right that the Improvements of 1989 created by using the talismatic word "shall."
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tracted panel deliberations, establishing a method for determining the length of
time a panel might take in completing a proceeding. The Improvements provided
that in no case was a panel to take more than nine months from time of establish-
ment to the time of submission.45
Sixth, the Improvements addressed, albeit in a limited way, one of the most
vexing problems of the panel procedures, monitoring the implementation of the
panel's recommendations. They enhanced the powers available to monitor imple-
mentation, although they did not vest in any entity any greater power to enforce
implementation or authorize self-help in the event implementation was less than
stellar. 46 Still, given the sensitivity and importance of this area, this step was
clearly one forward for the legalists.
Finally, the Improvements took a tentative step towards a strong adjudicatory
approach by authorizing the parties to settle their disputes by resort to binding
arbitration.4 7 Though the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the parties proba-
bly could have done this in any event. Yet the formal recognition of binding
arbitration as a useful device within the GATT context was significant and signaled
an important, though obviously limited, step in the direction of supporting formal
adjudicatory-type dispute resolution for GATT trade disputes.4 8
Major hurdles still confronted the legalists, however, even after the Improve-
ments of 1989. Most importantly, the Improvements did not address questions
surrounding adoption and implementation of panel reports. A contracting party
could enjoy the application of more clear-cut procedural rules and the satisfaction
of a more speedy determination by a panel with a more independent composition,
but that putatively successful party still might not enjoy real fruits from that
victory. The responding party might still block the adoption of a report, relegating
the decision to that netherworld of persuasive, but nonbinding decisions. Even
if a decision were adopted, the mechanisms for monitoring compliance were
limited at best, and the tools for implementation were virtually nonexistent. The
GATT's teeth had been sharpened, but the strength of the jaws was still decidedly
limited.49
45. Id. § F(f).
46. Id. § 1.
47. Id. § E.
48. For interesting and useful discussions of the various practical and conceptual problems binding
arbitration raises in the context of the GATT, see MontafiA i Mora, supra note 2, at 138-40; Pe-
tersmann, supra note 5, at 323 et seq. For more detailed analysis of the Improvements of 1989, see
Erice Canal-Forgues & Rudolf Ostrihansky, New Developments in the GATT Dispute Settlement
Procedures, 24 J. WORLD TRADE 67 (1990); W. Davey, GATT Dispute Settlement: The Montreal
Reforms, in LIVING WITH FREE TRADE: CANADA, THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT AND THE GATT
167 (R. Dearden ed., 1989); Erwin P. Eichmann, Procedural Aspects of GA 7T Dispute Settlement:
Moving Towards Legalism, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 38 (1990).
49. For a thorough analysis of the Improvements and the need for further refinements, see E.
Petersmann, Mid-Term Review Agreements of the Uruguay Round and the 1989 Improvements to
the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures, 32 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 280 (1989).
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B. UNDERSTANDING OF 1994
In a final act of desperation to save what appeared to be a dying Round, the
director general of the GATT offered a Draft Final Act in December of 1991
that contained an "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes under Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade." This proposal, in only slightly modified form, was adopted
and signed by the Ministers in Marrakech in April 1991 and became the "Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes."
Though still paying some lip service to the diplomats, this document embodies
the biggest move of all into the legalist camp and deserves close attention. It
repeats, almost verbatim, many of the Improvements' innovative provisions,
especially regarding consultations, good offices and mediation, and panel proce-
dures. However, it also contains some rather far-reaching provisions dealing
with a number of important aspects of GATT dispute resolution. Of those many
changes, seven deserve particular comment and scrutiny.
1. Establishment of the Dispute Settlement Body
First, the Understanding creates the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to adminis-
ter the rules and procedures of the Understanding and otherwise assume the role
of the General Council (and the committees under the various special agreements),
particularly with respect to providing good offices and conciliatory or mediatory
services.5 ° Article 2 of the Understanding specifically mentions the authority of
the DSB to "establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain
surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize
suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements."
The DSB, as an integral part of the newly created World Trade Organization
(WTO), will consist of members of that latter organization who choose to join
the DSB. Thus, presumably all the members of the WTO will also be members
of the DSB.
2. Expanded Scope of the Basic GATT Dispute Resolution Process
Second, in stark contrast to the Tokyo Round, which created different dispute-
resolution mechanisms for many of the Codes negotiated thereunder,5 the Under-
standing substantially increases the scope of coverage of the general GATT dis-
pute-resolution process. It explicitly provides that the Understanding's
dispute-resolution rules and procedures shall apply to disputes arising under all
the Agreements listed in Appendix 1, which includes the Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization (WTO); the Multilateral Trade Agreements (Trade
50. Understanding of 1994, supra note 39, art. 2.
51. For a good discussion of the various dispute resolution mechanisms, their relationship to
the GATT, their relationship to each other, and their desirability, see Jackson, supra note 32, at
12-44.
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in Goods; Trade in Services; Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property);
and, upon agreement by the participants, the Plurilateral Trade Agreements (Civil
Aircraft; Government Procurement; Dairy; and Bovine Meat). 2
This change is not total, however. Article 1 further requires the parties to
follow, in preference to the rules in the Understanding, some of the "special or
additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement" contained in some of the
specific GATT agreements, particularly those rules referenced in appendix 2.
Nevertheless, the Understanding is undoubtedly a substantial step towards unify-
ing the GATT dispute-resolution processes and away from the philosophy of the
Tokyo Round.
3. Exclusivity of GATT Dispute Resolution
Process for GAT7 Disputes
Third, the Understanding leaves no doubt that it is intended to strengthen
the multilateral trading system. In an article clearly signaling this intent,
entitled "Strengthening of the Multilateral System," the ministers impose
upon the member states a requirement to seek "recourse to, and abide by,
the rules and procedures of this Understanding," when seeking redress of a
"violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under
the covered agreements ....,54 Article 23 goes on to specify that the members
"shall . . .not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred
• ..except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules
and procedures of this Understanding. . . "In short, the Understanding leaves
no doubt that freelance, unilateral, or even unauthorized bilateral dispute reso-
lution is not acceptable.
However, the Understanding does not forbid the parties from resolving a dis-
pute by means other than a panel decision. Negotiations and consultations are still
allowed, indeed encouraged. The Understanding specifically invites the parties to
resolve disputes through mutual agreement. It also adopts, virtually intact, the
provisions of the Improvements of 1989 regarding negotiation, consultation, good
offices, conciliation, and mediation."
The Understanding also allows the parties, by mutual agreement, to submit a
52. Understanding of 1994, supra note 39, art. 1. Regarding the Plurilateral Trade
Agreements, the appendix predicates applicability of the Understanding on "the adoption of a
decision by the parties to each agreement setting out the terms for the application of the Understand-
ing to the individual agreement, including any special or additional rules or procedures for
inclusion in Appendix 2 .... " Id. app. 1.
53. Appendix 2 lists particular provisions of a variety of agreements, including, for example,
numerous articles from the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing; article 14.2 through 14.4, annex
2, of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; and a variety of articles in the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Id. app. 2.
54. Understanding of 1994, supra note 39, art. 23.
55. See id. 3-5. A few time limits are tightened here and there and a few words changed, but
otherwise the Understanding of 1994 largely echoes the Improvements of 1989.
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dispute that concerns "issues that are clearly defined by both parties" to binding
arbitration as an alternative to the establishment of a panel.56 As noted earlier,
grants of permission to the parties to use binding arbitration may not have been
necessary previously. In light of the new provisions that proscribe the parties
from using any dispute-resolution processes other than those contained in the
Understanding, however, this specific authorization now becomes necessary if
the parties are to employ binding arbitration to resolve these disputes."
In general terms, the intent of this imposition of exclusivity of procedures
and substance appears designed to limit the distortions of procedure and, more
importantly, substance that might occur when countries of vastly different eco-
nomic and political power are in disagreement. Nonpanel resolution of disputes
is permitted, even encouraged in some forms, but the range of possible alternatives
to which the parties can have recourse and the substantive rules the parties can
apply are all limited. In theory, the parties may resolve disputes only in the
approved ways and using the approved substantive rules. Of course, the extent
to which the imposition of these requirements will really insulate disagreements
from exogenous political and economic factors is much harder to predict, but
the goal of the Understanding is unmistakable.
4. Facilitation of Establishment of a Panel
Fourth, the Understanding takes a number of steps that make the establishment
of a panel not only a certainty, but also more quickly and efficiently accomplished.
In the first place, the Understanding makes it clear that the DSB must establish
a panel at the request of an aggrieved party.58 In theory, the DSB can decline a
56. Id. art. 25. The Understanding of 1994 limits use of arbitration to disputes concerning issues
"that are clearly defined by both parties." Id. The Understanding also contains rules regarding
notification to all members, but limits intervention of third parties to situations where all the parties
to the arbitration agree to allow participation of the third party. The Understanding also requires
application of its rules regarding surveillance of implementation of recommendations (art. 21) and
compensation and the suspension of concessions (art. 22).
57. The status of arbitration decisions in the broader scheme of GATT dispute resolution is still
a bit unclear, however. The Understanding of 1994 does not specifically address the jurisprudential
status of arbitral decisions or the relationship of the arbitral decisions to decisions of the panels and
the appellate body, and thus fails to resolve fully the problem of precisely what contribution the
decisions of arbitral tribunals are to make to the development of a coherent, consistent body of GATT
jurisprudence.
At the same time, however, the Understanding of 1994, in its quest to unify GATT procedure
and substantive GATT law, takes steps that will facilitate integration of arbitral decisions into the
general corpus of persuasive GATT law. First, the Understanding clearly specifies that binding
arbitrations take place within the WTO. Second, by requiring the parties in various places to resolve
all disputes through application of the agreed-upon substantive GATT rules, the Understanding
would seem to require the tribunals to apply those, and only those, rules. These two aspects of the
Understanding may well increase the degree to which one can view arbitration decisions as helpful,
and occasionally even persuasive, in resolving sticky GATT problems. Of course, the degree to
which parties resort to arbitration and the degree to which tribunals become persuasive expositors
of GATT rules still remains to be seen.
58. Understanding of 1994, supra note 39, art. 6.
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country's request if all DSB members agree by consensus not to establish a panel.
But since the requesting country would presumably not join such a consensus,
as a practical matter the DSB must always establish a panel when requested.
This reversal of the normal presumption regarding the operation of the consen-
sus rule is just one of the ways the Understanding has made the operation of the
general adjudicatory-type dispute rules much more automatic. In the past, Council
consensus was usually required to act. This requirement rarely, if ever, resulted
in a refusal to establish a panel. It often delayed the establishment, however,
while the parties engaged in meaningless semantic struggles over whether anyone
had a right to the establishment of a panel and the precise remit of the panel.
The new rule, on the other hand, requires unanimity to stop a particular act, in this
case, the establishment of a panel. The Understanding makes the establishment of
a panel-as well as various other actions-virtually automatic and completely
assured.
The Understanding also obligates the DSB to act with dispatch in establishing
a panel. To assist in this process, the secretariat is required to maintain a list of
qualified individuals.5"
The Understanding also attempts to eliminate drawn-out disputes over the terms
of reference. It gives the parties twenty days to establish their own terms of
reference for the panel and then provides default terms of reference in the event
the parties cannot agree. 6°
5. Automatic Adoption of Panel Reports
Perhaps the most startling innovation of the Understanding is its creation of
a rule of almost automatic adoption of panel reports. Article 16.4 provides:
"Within 60 days after the date of circulation of a panel report to the Members,
the report shall be adopted at a DSB meeting [footnote omitted] unless a party
to the dispute formally notifies the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB
decides by consensus not to adopt the report." One of the main complaints of
the prior regime concerned the difficulty of securing adoption of panel reports.
Panel reports frequently remained unadopted for years because one or more
member states disagreed with the panel's ruling or recommendations. Countries
also occasionally withheld approval of a panel report in retaliation for some
country's unwillingness to allow adoption of a panel report favorable to the first
country. In short, to the great dissatisfaction of many countries, panel reports
often were relegated to the status of debating points, rather than serving as binding
decisions with which a country had to comply.
59. Id. art. 8.4.
60. Id. art. 7. The fallback terms of reference contained in id. art.7.1 are:
To examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (name of the covered agreement(s)
cited by the parties to the dispute), the manner referred to the DSB by (name of party)
in document . . . and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the
recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in that/those agreement(s).
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The new rules ensure that a victorious party will at least have the satisfaction
of an authoritative, putatively binding decision in its favor. As an astute commen-
tator has noted:
This provision not only eliminates one of the main stumbling blocks of the former
regime-the requirement of consensus for the adoption of panel reports-but also intro-
duces a shift of influence from the Contracting Parties to the panels and the Appellate
Body. This enhances the judicial nature of the panel process.6'
Of great interest in this regard, though beyond the scope of this paper, is the
debate over the effect of panel and appellate body rulings on domestic law.62
6. Establishment of the Standing Appellate Body
Sixth, in what is perhaps the most definitive move in the direction of legalism,
the Understanding requires the DSB to establish a standing appellate body to
hear appeals from panel cases.63
To establish the appellate body, the DSB is required to appoint seven nongovern-
mental individuals "of recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law,
international trade and the subject matter of covered agreements generally" to
serve four-year terms. 64 Any party to the dispute, except for third parties, may ap-
peal the ruling. The appellate body, sitting in panels of three, then must hear the
appeal and, as a general rule, issue its report within sixty days of a party's notifica-
tion of its decision to appeal. 65 The appellate body may uphold, modify, or reverse
the legal conclusions of the panel. 66 In clear support of American legalism, how-
ever, the appellate body may, in reaching its decision, review only "issues of law
covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel." 
67
The establishment of the appellate body in no way diminishes the automatic
adoption of binding decisions, however. A party may slightly delay the day of
reckoning by seeking appellate review of an adverse ruling. Nevertheless, the
appellate body's ruling is subject to basically the same rule as that of the panel,
namely, adoption is automatic unless the DSB members agree otherwise by con-
sensus. 68 This automatic adoption occurs within thirty days following the circula-
tion of the appellate body's report.
61. Montaiii i Mora, supra note 2, at 150.
62. For an insightful analysis of that issue, see Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, U.S. Trade Law
and Policy Series No. 21: GATTDispute Settlement Agreement: Internationalization or Elimination of
Section 301?, 26 INT'L LAW. 795 (1992). See also Montafi i Mora, supra note 2, at 163-76.
63. Understanding of 1994, supra note 39, art. 17.
64. Id. The members may be reappointed once. Moreover, in order to ensure that all the terms
of the members of the appellate body do not expire at the same time, article 17 requires that three
of the first seven appointees receive only two-year terms.
65. Id. art. 17.5.
66. Id. art. 17.13.
67. Id. art. 17.6.
68. Id. art. 17.14 reads, in part: "An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt the Appellate Body report ......
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7. Surveillance of Implementation of
Recommendations and Rulings
Among the biggest problems facing the GATT over the years was the disinclina-
tion of countries to follow the recommendations of panel reports-even when
those reports were adopted-and the relatively weak GATT response to that
disinclination. The Understanding, in some of its most important innovations,
directly addresses this issue in a variety of ways. In particular, the Understanding
creates rules that will either strongly encourage a party to comply or allow an
aggrieved party to withdraw appropriate concessions almost at will.
First, the Understanding requires the concerned member to report to the DSB,
within thirty days of adoption of the panel report or the appellate body report,
its "intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations and rulings
of the DSB. "69 If the party indicates that it cannot implement the recommendations
immediately, the Understanding establishes procedures to ensure the determina-
tion of a reasonable time within which the party should comply.
The first step in those procedures is a proposal by the offending party itself.
That proposal must be approved by the DSB, apparently by consensus. If the
DSB does not approve that proposal-and, of course, the aggrieved party can
assure such approval is withheld if it is unhappy with the proposal-then the
parties are apparently thrown back to negotiations, at least for forty-five days.
If agreement cannot be reached within that time period, then the provisions of
the Understanding commit the issue of timing to binding arbitration.7 ° Since
neither party can force its will on the other in these circumstances, it is quite
possible that arbitration will frequently be invoked to determine a reasonable
period of time, at least until notional guidelines are developed regarding this
issue.
Second, the Understanding makes specific provision to evaluate and monitor
the consistency of proposed compliance measures with the GATT, as well as
the adequacy of the implementation in general. For example, in the event the
parties are in disagreement about whether the offending party's implementation
measures are consistent with the GATT, recourse may again be had to the dispute
resolution procedures, with a preference expressed for submitting the matter to
the original panel, if possible.7
Third, if an aggrieved party does not think the offending party's compliance
has been adequate or timely, it may require the offending party to enter into
negotiations "with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation." 72
If agreement is not reached within twenty days, the aggrieved party "may request
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned
69. Id. art. 21.
70. Id. art. 21.3.
71. Id. art. 21.5.
72. Id. art. 22.2.
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of concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements." 73 The DSB
is required to approve the aggrieved party's request within thirty days unless it
decides by consensus to reject it, or unless the offending party objects to the
level of suspension proposed.7 4 In the latter event, the matter-that is, the level
of suspension and whether such suspension is permitted under the covered
agreement-is referred to arbitration, the results of which the parties must accept
and the DSB must approve (unless the DSB decides unanimously to the contrary)."
Finally, the Understanding requires the DSB to monitor and periodically review
the implementation.
As is evident from these rules, the new dispute-resolution procedures are
designed to increase substantially the likelihood of compliance with panels' or
the appellate body's rulings. Adoption of reports is virtually automatic. If the
offending party does not agree to conform with sufficient speed, the aggrieved
party can force the timing issue to binding arbitration, the results of which are
again automatically adopted. If the aggrieved party is not happy with the nature
or degree of compliance, however, it can unilaterally specify which concessions
it intends to withdraw, a result the DSB must again automatically approve. The
offending party can object to the level of the other party's withdrawal of conces-
sions and force that particular issue to binding arbitration. But the results of that
arbitration are binding on the offending party and, as the Understanding states,
"the parties concerned shall not seek a second arbitration.' 76 In short, the of-
fending party is eventually told in no uncertain terms that it is to accept all these
rulings and decisions.
III. Conclusion
A. A CLEAR STEP TOWARDS LEGALISM
The Understanding decisively moves the GATT dispute-resolution process
towards a unified, coherent adjudicatory system. No party to a dispute can force
resolution outside the established GATT procedures. Aggrieved states have a
functional right to invoke the panel process. Third parties have limited rights to
73. Id. art. 22.2. The Understanding also establishes relatively concrete "principles and proce-
dures" to guide the aggrieved party in its determination of what concessions or other obligations
to suspend. Id. art. 22.3.
74. Id. art. 22.6.
75. Id. art. 22.7. The Understanding is explicit that the arbitral tribunal is not to "examine the
nature of the concessions or other obligations to be suspended," but rather only "whether the level
of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment . . . if the proposed
suspension of concessions or other obligations is allowed under the covered agreement," and, if
requested by the offending party, whether "the principles and procedures set forth in paragraph 3
have not been followed .. " Id. In the event the aggrieved party has not followed the proper
principles and procedures, that party, and not the arbitrators, apparently goes back to the drawing
board and applies the principles and procedures in accordance with paragraph 3. Id.
76. Id. art. 22.7.
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intervene in cases of particular interest. The panelists, who must have considerable
GATT knowledge or experience, must follow prescribed procedures and apply
the principles and rules of the GATT. Appellate review of legal issues by a
standing body assigned to that task is assured. Rulings and recommendations
of either the panels or the appellate body must be adopted. The rulings and
recommendations are binding on the parties and must be accepted and imple-
mented within a reasonable period of time. In the event a party fails to implement
the recommendations within a reasonable period of time, the aggrieved party
can unilaterally withdraw concessions, as long as those concessions are within
the guidelines of the Understanding. These, and numerous other smaller changes,
make the GATT dispute-resolution process begin to look very judicial and adjudi-
catory in character and application.
B. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
At the same time, important issues regarding dispute resolution remain unre-
solved. For example, standing to bring a complaint within the GATT is still
limited to member states. If the goal is to depoliticize completely the dispute-
resolution process, then the advantages of recognizing complaints by nonstate
actors must be seriously weighed. Depoliticization has been the goal of many
investment treaties, and accordingly, these treaties allow unhappy foreign invest-
ors to dispute directly with the offending state in a neutral arbitral forum.77
The procedural rules governing the panel, arbitration, and appellate body pro-
ceedings also receive only passing attention in the Understanding or, for that
matter, in any other formal GATT document. The legal status of panel, arbitration,
and appellate body rulings also still remains somewhat unsettled. Will these
rulings establish precedents or is their force entirely limited to their persuasive
power?7"
Several other areas of the Understanding may not pass the test of time, but
three specific areas are of particular concern as threats to the integrity and efficacy
of the GATT dispute-resolution process.
1. Confidentiality
First, the Understanding basically maintains the confidential, closed nature of
GATT dispute-resolution proceedings. While the arguments for confidentiality
are certainly powerful, many groups whose interests are immediately and directly
affected by GATT decisions and rulings do not find this arrangement satisfactory.
A most telling example involves matters relating to the environment. GATT
panel decisions involving environmental issues have come under particular attack,
77. See, e.g., Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive
Rules and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, 27 INT'L LAW. 727, 731-37 (1993).
78. See supra text accompanying note 57.
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not only for their frequently inadequate reasoning, but also for the secretive
nature of the process by which the decisions are rendered.79
After the issuance of some of the panel rulings regarding the environment,
some parts of the environmental community launched serious, sustained attacks
against the GATT in general and the dispute-resolution processes in particular.
During the final stages of negotiation of the Uruguay Round, these groups spon-
sored full-page advertisements in major U.S. newspapers, attacking faceless
GATT bureaucrats bent on destroying the environment. Those advertisements
make it clear that the particular objects of the environmental community's ire
were not necessarily the negotiators, but rather the members of the GATT panels
who issued the problematic rulings.
Nor is the environmental community's attention on the dispute-resolution pro-
cess necessarily misplaced. It is fair to say that given trade negotiators' normal,
though sometimes unfortunate, penchant for explaining and defending (and some-
times even presenting) their positions in the press, the last remaining bastion of
real secrecy in the GATT is in the dispute-resolution process.
The environmental community's unhappiness over this process is not about
to go away, and more groups, including those representing labor, development,
and even human rights, are beginning to pick up the refrain. One can predict
that the pressure on the GATT to make its dispute-resolution processes more
public and open will increase significantly over the next few years.80
2. Enforcing Compliance
A second major issue involves the degree to which application of the procedures
outlined in the Understanding will adequately encourage compliance with panel
and appellate body rulings and recommendations. The Understanding takes a
clear step forward in encouraging compliance in two important respects. First,
79. For thorough presentations of the two extremes of this debate, see GREENPEACE INT'L,
UNCED UNDERMINED: WHY FREE TRADE WON'T SAVE THE PLANET (1992); Expanding Trade Can
Help Solve Environmental Problems, Says Report, GATT Doc. 1529 (Feb. 3, 1992); and GATT,
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).
80. The environmental community and other interest groups have also expressed concern that
GATT panels are composed solely of trade experts and thus the environmental or other "nontrade"
perspectives are slighted. The Understanding addresses this issue to some extent in article 13.2,
which provides:
Panels may seek information from any relevant source and may consult experts to
obtain their opinion on certain aspects of the matter. With respect to a factual issue
concerning a scientific or other technical matter raised by a party to a dispute, a panel
may request an advisory report in writing from an expert review group. Rules for
the establishment of such a group and its procedures are set forth in Appendix 4.
This provision is helpful, in that it explicitly acknowledges the authority of the panel to seek additional
information and establishes a procedure to facilitate the provision of such information. At the same
time, it does not take the one step most sought by various environmental groups, namely, the inclusion
of an environmental expert as a full-fledged member of the panel (or, one presumes, the appellate
body). Accordingly, one suspects that this solution, while a movement in the environmentalists'
direction, will ultimately not satisfy them.
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rulings and recommendations are almost automatically binding on the offending
country. This outcome will have some impact because countries generally prefer
to live up to their international obligations, especially in the economic arena.
Second, retaliation, or withdrawal of concessions in the event of noncompliance
is likewise almost automatic, and that prospect can be daunting.
At the same time, the only real pressure an aggrieved country can put on a
recalcitrant disputant is the withdrawal of concessions. If the economic disparity
between the disputants is great, this threat may be of relatively little significance
to the offending country. Moreover, as economists often note, withdrawing con-
cessions is the oddest sort of sanction because it frequently hurts the country
enforcing the sanction almost as much as it hurts the country against which the
sanction is imposed.
So far, the GATT does not provide for any concerted action against an offending
party, expulsion from the GATT, or any of the other types of international sanc-
tions that would genuinely ensure compliance. Again, the reasons for hesitating
to allow or require such sanctions may be compelling, 8' but until the sanctions
for noncompliance are enhanced, enforcement of rulings and recommendations
will always remain somewhat problematic.
3. Depoliticization
Third, and finally, one wonders whether the Understanding will really achieve
the ministers' goal of insulating GATT disputes from political pressure. As the
Uruguay Round negotiations themselves demonstrate with graphic clarity, trade
matters, almost by their very nature, remain highly political, both domestically
and internationally. The automaticity of the new dispute-resolution procedures
will certainly make it harder for a country to evade its responsibilities and will
even give an offending country some political cover to make necessary changes.
After all, at a purely domestic level, people are more likely to accept adverse
political decisions if those decisions are made by political institutions they consider
legitimate.
But this last statement highlights the major issue. Will the people consider the
GATT dispute-resolution mechanisms legitimate institutions to which they must
defer their political preferences? This question is not easy to answer.
Certainly many of the changes made through the Understanding will add consid-
erable credibility and legitimacy to the GATT. Moreover, the dispute-resolution
processes will occur under the guidance of, and within the context of, the WTO
and, accordingly, borrow whatever prestige and stature that institution develops.
Problems still remain, however. Institutions that operate entirely out of the
public view have a much harder time developing the credibility and legitimacy
required to ensure docile compliance.
81. See, e.g., James R. Cannon & Karen L. Bland, GATTPanels Need Restraining Principles,
24 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1167 (1993).
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While process is very important, legitimacy is also earned by the quality of
the substantive action the institution takes. Consistency, coherence, and persua-
siveness, along with many other qualities, are all necessary to give the decisions
of various institutions the legitimacy that ameliorates domestic opposition. In
this regard, GATT panels are going to have to improve the less than persuasive
analysis that has sometimes been seen in panel reports. Panel reports like those
issued in the U.S.-Mexico dispute over the U.S. embargo of Mexican tuna demon-
strate the need for improved quality and persuasive force. Only then will GATT
panel decisions become effective tools for quelling domestic opposition to the
strict application of GATT rulings.
Fair procedures are necessary to instill an institution with legitimacy, but in
the absence of completely effective enforcement power, the quality of the deci-
sions issued by the institution will also be an important determinate of legitimacy
and effectiveness. On that score, the Understanding is understandably and neces-
sarily silent.
C. A PROMISING START
On balance the changes generated by the Understanding are a clear step in
the direction of creating a more coherent, consistent, comprehensive, and obeyed
set of GATT principles and rules. The provisions of the Understanding appreci-
ably increase the likelihood that GATT disputes will be more efficiently resolved
and that the parties will enjoy more of the benefits for which they negotiated.
Whether the dispute-resolution processes mandated by the Understanding will
also increase the likelihood that disputes will be effectively resolved and that
GATT rules will be effectively enforced remains to be seen. The proof will be
in the practice.
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